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Abstract
Though European rail policies are aiming to introduce intra-modal competition in the railway sector, there are different ways to 
introduce intra-modal competition in the rail freight transport. This study compares three models for introducing competition in 
rail freight transport in the three countries; the UK, India, and Japan. The three cases show that there are different types of intra-
modal competition in the freight rail transport. This study briefly explains the models adopted by each of the three countries for 
introducing competition in the rail freight sector and investigates the advantages and disadvantages of each. The comparison 
among the three cases shows that a certain type of intra-modal competition cannot be applied to another country necessarily since 
the background and characteristics of the rail transport market vary depending on the countries.
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1. Introduction
Recent European rail policy aims to intensify intra-modal competition in the rail freight sector. Certainly, 
transport volume of the freight carried by railways in Europe has increased since the liberalization of the freight 
railway market in Europe. Nevertheless, the structure of railway organization has changed radically in order to 
introduce intra-modal competition in Europe. On the other hand, there are other countries, which have introduced 
competition in the rail freight market differently. This study compares three models for introducing competition in 
the rail freight transport in the three countries: the UK, India and Japan.  This study compares these three cases and 
tries to explain the outline and characteristics of each type.
2. Aims and methodology of the research
2.1. Aims of the research
As the three countries have introduced competition in the freight rail transport in different ways, this study 
investigates these three types and tries to explain in respect of each country:
1) Outline of the freight rail operation and intra-modal competition; 
2) Method of introducing competition in each country;
3) Results of the attempt to introduce intra-modal competition; and
4) Challenges faced in each model for introducing intra-modal competition.
2.2. Methodology and the Structure of the work
This research is mainly based on: 1) literature survey; 2) interviews; and 3) comparative analysis. This research 
has been facilitated due to the expertise of the first and second authors in railway operations of Japan and India 
respectively. They have been further helped by their widespread contacts in the rail industry in these two countries 
which has given access to information and data from their colleagues. 
As for the structure of the study, Chapter 3 discusses the case in European rail freight transport, especially 
focusing on the UK, which was already liberalized by open access. Chapter 4 discusses the case in rail container 
transport in India, and Chapter 5 discusses the case in rail freight transport in Japan. Following the investigation into 
the three cases, Chapter 6 compares the freight railway operation among the three cases and discusses in terms of the 
advantageous aspects and disadvantageous aspects of each type of railway operation. Finally, Chapter 7 presents 
brief conclusion from this study.
3. The case in the rail freight transport in the UK
3.1. EU Railway Policy
Since the railways in EU are obliged to follow EU railway regulations, this section explains the background and 
outline of the policy. In brief, railway policy in Europe aims to introduce competition within the railway sector 
through vertical separation. This policy of the European Commission originally intended to strengthen international 
rail freight transport by realizing through-train services from an origin to a destination similar to trucks on the road
(Fig. 1). This was done with the intention to address the problem faced by European railways of losing market share 
and absolute levels of traffic for many years (Nash (2007a)). In particular, railways were not able to compete 
effectively with road in international markets because several railway operators had to manage the freight for 
international transport, and the quality of international freight service was poor due to inadequate linkage between 
the companies at the border.
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                Source: Revise from Hori. M. (2000)
Fig. 1. Change of access models requested by the European Directives.
In order to change the access models and liberalize the international railway transport as Fig.1 shows, an 
infrastructure manager has to permit access right to other international railway undertakings. In order to promote 
such international rail freight transport, the European Commission issued a number of Directives. One of the most 
fundamental ones, Directives 91/440, was issued in July 1991. Interestingly, it was intended not only for promoting 
international rail freight transport but also for encouraging competition between European’s national rail operators. 
Specifically, the Directives demanded that the railways should follow the key principles:
1) to ensure the managerial independence of railway undertakings;
2) to create and operate separate accounts for infrastructure and operations;
3) to ensure that infrastructure accounts balance, including government grants for specific social obligations;
4) to allow open access to each national network for certain types of international transport operators and railway 
undertakings from other member states.
As shown above, originally, the policy promoting open access was introduced to make international rail freight 
competitive, and the member countries were required to liberalize the international rail freight market by 2006. Then, 
the requirement was extended to the domestic freight market by 2007, and the focus has shifted to encouraging 
competition between rail operators.
3.2. Operation and outcome of open access in the EU freight railway market
Despite EU Directives, there is variation in the model of railway operation from one European country to the 
other. Over the period 1994 – 1997, the British railway industry was fundamentally reformed following the model of 
Sweden, where the national railways were reformed as the first case in 1988. That model, which is called the 
complete separation model, separated infrastructure from operations. By splitting the railway operation and 
management into several entities, the infrastructure manager has become responsible for infrastructure works 
including 1) construction and maintenance works of infrastructure and tracks; 2) timetabling; 3) signaling and train 
controlling; 4) other works related with infrastructure management.
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                               Source: Eurostat (2014)
Fig. 2. Transition of freight transport volume of the four countries in EU.
Fig. 2 shows the freight rail transport volume of the UK along with that of Sweden, Germany and France. 
Although the GDP in those four countries increased by similar rates, it shows that the freight rail transport volume 
has decreased in France, where the liberalization of the freight rail market is relatively slow. On the other hand, the 
freight rail transport volume in the UK, Sweden and Germany, all of which liberalized the freight rail market 
through open access, has successfully increased their rail freight volume. Although it is difficult to define the 
reasons for the contrasting results in these four countries, some of the experts interviewed noted that improvement of 
rail freight traffic was attained through a new railway transport market created by the new freight operators and their 
competitive pressure on the incumbent operator (Kurosaki (2008)).
3.3. Issues arising from railway restructuring in EU countries
Despite the favorable effects that open access policy might have had on the transport volume, splitting the 
railway management and operations into the infrastructure manager and the train operating companies resulted in 
coordination problems between them. These coordination problems between the entities occur at every stage of 
railway operation such as investment, production planning, timetabling and other daily operations (Nash (2007b);
Velde (2015)).
For example, the reformed railways in the UK implement timetabling through following steps;
Step 1) each operator applies for time-slots;
Step 2) the infrastructure manager allocates infrastructure capacity fairly and without discrimination (this 
responsibility is stipulated by the EC Directive);
Step 3) the infrastructure manager adjusts the infrastructure capacity and makes timetable by communicating with 
multiple operators.
As Fig. 3 shows, much information must be exchanged between the infrastructure manager and multiple 
independent operators several times. The reform made this procedure more complicated as the traditional integrated 
railway could implement this procedure within a sole organization smoothly. Kurosaki (2008) interviewed former 
managers in BR and found that the infrastructure manager has difficulties to coordinate the operators’ application 
especially in the cases where: 1) infrastructure capacity is limited; 2) several operators apply for the same time-slots; 
and 3) there is no sufficient time for maintenance works. Kurosaki (ibid.) also showed that they have disputes 
among them especially in these cases: 1) an operator meets with an accident or traffic delay because of other 
operator’s responsibility; 2) an operator faces different interpretations of the infrastructure manager’s decision rules 
for train priority; 3) an infrastructure manager plans sudden engineering works, which requires cutting a scheduled 
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train. Velde et al. (2012) have also found that dense networks need particularly close co-ordination and that the costs 
of imposing complete vertical separation rise dramatically. 
                                         Source: Based on Kurosaki (2008)
Fig. 3. Procedure for timetabling in vertically separated railways with open access.
The model of railway reform in the UK separated the railway operation into train operating companies and an 
infrastructure manager as completely independent entities. Certainly, since there are few sunk costs for the operators, 
it has become easier for train operating companies to enter the railway market, and they started to compete in the 
same rail freight market. Nevertheless, despite the advantages of introducing competition through open access, 
European railways worry about coordination problems especially in dense networks.
4. The case of competition in container transport in India
4.1. Container Transport in India
In India, Indian Railways (IR) operates the railways as a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly. In 1989, its 
intermodal freight business dealing with container transport was hived off into a wholly owned subsidiary company 
called Concor, which was established as the sole rail container freight operator. Progressively IR divested its share-
holding in Concor and presently it holds 63% of the equity of the company. Nevertheless, in January 2006, the 
Ministry of Railways ended Concor’s monopoly and allowed private and public sector operators to run container 
trains on the IR network. This was done in order to meet growing container traffic with the objective of increasing 
rail share of containerized traffic and non-bulk traffic traditionally not being carried by IR due to its thrust on bulk 
traffic. This was the first significant move that private operators could provide freight transport services in the 
domain of railway operation (Singh (2008)).
Nevertheless, the way of new entry into the railway market is largely different from the way that EU regulation 
stipulates. The most significant difference is that the function of haulage, including the supply of locomotives, 
drivers and other associated staff, continues to be the monopoly of IR. This means that both Concor and the new 
entrants are obliged to utilize IR’s locomotives and IR’s crews when they operate their trains on the IR owned 
infrastructure while they are responsible for the wagons and terminals. The other important difference is that 
liberalization of entry has been permitted only in the container freight sector and other freight segments such as coal 
and all other commodities are still operated by IR.
4.2. New Entries and Outcomes
The outcome of the above policy has been notable. Since the launch of this policy in 2005, 16 new entrants 
obtained licenses to run container trains on IR’s network and all have already started operations according to 
information received from Ministry of Railways. Since the haulage is still undertaken by IR, compared with the full 
railway operation by freight operators in EU countries, in the Indian case there has not been a significant reform 
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from the view point of railway operation itself. And as the railway operation requires close coordination between 
infrastructure and operation, new entry in container transport in India raises less coordination problems than those in 
EU countries. IR can manage the essential factors for railway operation such as 1) maintenance of tracks and 
infrastructure; 2) capacity allocation and timetabling; 3) route setting (daily traffic controlling and signaling); 4) 
operation and maintenance of locomotives; 5) daily operation of trains (train driving and crew rostering). Since 
these essential factors for railway operation are implemented by IR only, the railway sector in India faced fewer 
coordination problems than that in the UK, and it has been possible for IR to make investment in the railway system 
with co-ordination while the entrants and incumbent operator, Concor, make investments in acquisition of wagons 
and terminal development.  
The new operators faced entry barriers of which the most significant was a lack of access to terminals. There are 
still some barriers to entering the market such as those related to terminals and uncertainty of haulage charges. A 
few issues also impose a constraint on the rapid growth of this traffic stream such as apprehension of Indian 
Railways that container operators may be diverting traffic which may be carried by IR in wagons. Container 
Transport Operators (CTOs) also seek better operational efficiency and assured transit from railways. IR on its part 
would like the CTOs to make more efforts to attract non-bulk traffic like white goods and other goods in which 
conventionally it is not able to compete with the road sector. 
As for the transport volume of containers in India, it has been increasing rapidly because of the economic growth 
of the nation. According to the latest information obtained from IR, a total of 3.19 million TEUs were carried by rail 
in 2014-15 of which 2.14 million were carried by Concor and 1.05 million were carried by 16 other operators. The 
respective shares of Concor and the new operators were 67% and 33% respectively. For comparison, Singh et al.
(2010) notes that the total containers handed by Concor were 2.42 million TEUs and those handed by CTOs were 
0.173 million TEUs in 2007-08 which means other operators handled about 6.7% of the total containers. This shows 
that the new operators have managed to increase their share in the last 7 years although Concor continues to be the 
dominant player. As for the investment by CTOs, they had invested nearly Rs 30 billion in terminals, rakes, and rake 
handling equipment (Gangwar and Raghuram (2010)). According to Indian Railways’ information, since the entry 
has been allowed, the new operators have procured around 5,000 wagons and set up 15 new terminals. Concor has a 
fleet of around 10,000 wagons and has developed 63 terminals. Thus, this policy has led to large investment into the 
railway sector which has contributed to shifting of freight transport from other modes to rail container transport.
5. The case in freight transport in Japan
5.1. Outline of railway reform in Japan 
In order to understand the outline of railway freight transport in Japan, this section overviews the reform of the 
Japanese National Railways (JNR) in 1987. As railways in Japan are passenger-dominated, JNR had accumulated 
heavy debts especially in the freight sector. In addition to financial difficulties, JNR also faced severe criticism 
against its ineffective management.
In April 1987, JNR was finally reformed and split into six passenger companies and a single freight company (JR 
Freight). Through the railway reform, the unprofitable freight division was separated from the profitable passenger 
division and JR Freight was established as a nationwide freight operator. Thus, although Japan has a number of 
small size private railways, most of which have only short track between a port and a factory, JR Freight is a single 
nationwide railway, which was established through JNR reform.
Since the reform in 1987, each of the six passenger railway companies owns the infrastructure of the trunk lines. 
Thus, JR Freight pays access charges to the passenger railway companies and utilizes the infrastructure to perform 
freight railway operation.
5.2. Outcome of freight transport in Japan
As noted above, a single nationwide rail freight operator, JR Freight operates freight railway since the JNR 
reform in 1987. Thus, unlike European liberalized freight market, there is no on-track competition in the Japanese 
freight market. Nevertheless, JNR reform had a large impact on the transport volume of JR Freight. 
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                          Source: MLIT (2014)
Fig. 4. Transition of freight transport volume in Japan.
As Fig. 4 shows, the transport volume of freight railway had been on a serious down-turn trend since the 1970s 
until JNR reform. But, this trend changed during the period of JNR reform and JR Freight has kept a steady 
performance since the reform. The reason for this radical change can be regarded as the institutional change and the 
active business operations of JR Freight as an independent company because economic conditions in Japan have 
steadily progressed even during the period until the 1980s’ when rail freight volume was declining.
Although all the shares of JR Freight are still owned by the government, the institutional form of the freight 
sector in Japan was drastically changed from the public entity to an independent corporation. As a result, JR freight 
has become very customer-focused, and its attitude has become friendly towards clients who use rail freight service. 
In the opinion of the experts interviewed, the radical change of the transport volume trends can be attributed to the 
change of the business focus that occurred due to JNR reform (Kurosaki (2008)).
Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of competition in the railway market, there has not been a serious change at the 
time of JNR reform. Before the reform, JNR provided rail freight transport services along with passenger transport 
services. Since the passenger sector and freight sector were separated into different companies, at present JR Freight 
provides rail freight transport services. Thus, whereas the characteristics of the entity have changed from the public 
entity to a public-owned corporation, only a single entity provides rail freight services in the both cases. In other 
words, there has not been a competition between freight railway operators that we can find in the European freight 
railway transport market.
5.3. Competition between the forwarders
Despite the fact that there has not been a competition between freight railway operators, there is a certain kind of 
competition in the freight railway transport market. It is a competition between forwarders, and several forwarders 
compete outside of the on-rail transport. Fig. 5 shows the outline of the market structure of freight railway transport 
services as a whole.
In Japanese freight transport market, it is common that each client asks forwarders for freight transport services, 
and there are several forwarders in the market. As these forwarders provide off-rail transport such as road transport, 
they compete with each other to provide transport services efficiently. Also, since each client can select a good 
forwarder to make a contract, several forwarders compete seeking for a client. Thus, although a single freight 
railway operator, JR Freight, has been providing on-rail freight transport services, there is competition in the 
provision of off-rail transport services. This helps in enlarging the market for railway freight transport services in 
Japan. 
In Japan, many passenger trains are operated on the trunk lines, where JR Freight operates its trains. Thus, if 
some other freight railway companies access the lines, timetabling, and the train operation will be too complex. In 
practice, JR Freight is a state-owned railway that was established by JNR reform, and its access charges to the
passenger company have been stipulated at relatively low level, namely avoidable costs are only charged, for 
sustaining the management of JR Freight.
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                   Source: Author referring to Ozawa (2002)
Fig.5. Outline of the whole structure of freight railway transport services.
Up to the present, there has been no official proposal to allow more entry into the railway freight transport 
services competing with JR Freight. Even in the case of any new entry, possibility is very high that the access 
charges that are at the same level with JR Freight cannot be admitted to the new entrant, since the current access 
charges do not cover a part of fix costs.
Considering the fact mentioned above, it appears to be difficult to accept several freight operators in the dense 
network in Japan. Thus, promoting competition in off-rail transport services while maintaining single operator i.e. 
JR Freight for on-rail transport services seems to be appropriate for the circumstances in Japan.
6. Comparison of the three models 
6.1. Issues regarding competition and separation of the railway management 
This paper examined the three different cases to operate freight railway transport and explained that they differ 
largely in terms of the model of competition and railway operation.
Firstly, as for the case in the UK, the EU regulations stipulate open access and several new railway freight 
operators entered the market. But, in order to promote open access, many key elements of railway operation such as 
maintenance of tracks and infrastructure, capacity allocation and timetabling, route setting (daily traffic controlling 
and signaling) have been separated and are being managed by the infrastructure manager. Under the separated 
structure, several entities have to make close transactions to operate the railway. Thus, this model has faced 
coordination problems between infrastructure and operations despite the advantages of competition between the 
freight railway operators.
Secondly, as for the container transport in India, the Indian government allowed the private and public sector 
operators to enter the container operation segment. However, the distinct difference from the UK model is that it is 
regulated so that IR must haul all container trains, regardless of whether they are trains of Concor or of the new 
entrants. Thus, compared with the case in the UK, this model has an advantage that essential factors of railway 
operation such as slot allocation and timetabling can be integrated into a single organization, which make it possible 
to operate railway system smoothly. In terms of promoting private participation and competition, several new 
entrants entered the market and started a competition.  Though the coordination issues are fewer than the UK model, 
the study found there are some issues such as inconsistency in haulage charges levied by Indian Railways and lack 
of access to new terminals from which the entrants could operate their trains.
Thirdly, as for the freight railway in Japan, since the railway reform in 1987, only a single state-owned operator, 
JR Freight, has been providing nationwide freight railway services. Though JR Freight is required to negotiate with 
a passenger railway company, which owns and manages infrastructure, freight railways in Japan can be operated 
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with less negotiation with concerned entities than other cases. Despite the fact that there has not been competition 
among freight railway operators in Japan, several forwarders compete in the scope of off-rail transport services, and 
they play a role in increasing the freight volume in the railway sector.
The above comparison among the three models can be summarized as Table 1.
6.2. Discussions 
As Table 1 shows the three models have introduced different degrees of competition in the freight railway sector. 
Nevertheless, when the sector tries to introduce the high degree of competition, as shown by open access in the UK, 
coordination problems would be enlarged. On the other hand, when the sector introduces less degree of competition 
as shown by off-rail competition in Japan, on-rail operation and management can be integrated, and the railways do 
not face severe coordination problems.
Table 1. Comparison of the freight railway operation in the UK, India and Japan.
the UK India Japan
Competition (On-rail competition) Yes Yes No
(Off-rail competition) Yes Yes Yes
Railway 
Operation
(Number of entities for 
haulage of freight trains )
                   Several                  Single (IR)       Single (JR Freight)
(Number of entities
providing railway freight 
services)
About 8 operators 
(More than 16 companies 
obtained licenses)
16 operators Single (JR Freight)
(Degree of coordination
problems)
Large Moderate Limited
(Scope and background of 
coordination problems)
Problems exist in daily 
railway operation as essential 
factors of railway operation
are separated into different
entities.
Problems are limited to the
operational issues in yards and 
some regulatory issues.
Problems are very limited as 
JR Freight is a single freight 
operator.
Through the investigation and comparison of the three cases, it appears that the appropriate institutional model to 
operate freight railway appears to vary by circumstances. As the final part of this study, the following discusses 
three factors that should be considered to design the appropriate model. 
Firstly, it should be noted that open access policy in EU regulation was introduced to promote mutual access to 
other countries’ network. Also, it was intended to promote it by introducing on-track competition. The latter factor 
should not be missed because mutual access has been attained smoothly in the case of through-train services in 
Japan, where on-track competition is not intended. Thus, if the transport market does not require mutual access by 
different railways with on-track competition, the appropriate model for efficient railway operation looks to be 
different from that in Europe. For example, the railway sector in India and Japan do not have other freight operators 
that should promote mutual access. Thus, their background is so different from the one in Europe.
Secondly, the recent study clarified that vertical separation for open access increases costs largely when the 
traffic density of the network is high since dense networks need particularly close coordination within the railway 
system (Velde et al. (2012)).  From this point of research results, we have to be very careful to introduce open 
access by vertical separation to the network with high traffic densities. From this perspective, it is very difficult to 
introduce open access in the freight sector in Japan as the trunk lines on which JR Freight’s trains operate are very 
dense.
Thirdly, although competition is one of the useful measures to make railway organization efficient, there are 
other factors that can work for the same purpose of improving efficiency. Private participation, autonomy of railway 
management, an incentive to improve the system, freedom from the political intervention might be some of those 
factors. For example, the freight railway sector in Japan had improved its efficiency after JNR reform. However, 
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since off-rail competition existed at the time of JNR era as well, additional competition has not been introduced by 
JNR reform. From the Japanese experience, it can be concluded that some of the above factors have worked because
the performance of the freight sector has been improved since its conversion to an independent state-owned 
company in the JNR reform.
7. Conclusion
This study compared three models to introduce competition in the rail freight transport focusing on the 
experiences in the three countries; the UK, India, and Japan. The three cases show that there are different degrees of 
competition in the freight rail transport. Whereas the highest degree of on-track competition can be attained through 
open access, this model requires separation of essential factors of railway operation such as slot allocation and train 
controls, and this separation raises coordination problems between infrastructure and operation. The study also 
showed the historical background that the open access policy was introduced in the EU for establishing a single 
railway area by promoting competitive mutual access to the network. On the other hand, Japan has not introduced 
competition in the scope of on-rail transport services. But the freight railway transport market itself has an incentive 
to enlarge its transport volume as there are sufficient degrees of competition in the scope of off-rail transport 
services. The study about Japanese case also showed that the historical background of JNR reform resulted in 
sustaining the management of JR Freight by stipulating its relatively low-level access charges, and it appears to be 
difficult to permit a new entry by the similar access charges.
As these cases show, several countries have introduced different degrees of competition in their freight railway 
sector according to the background of the reform and characteristics of the rail transport market. The results of this 
study lead the conclusion that a uniform type of intra-modal competition cannot be applied from one country’s 
experience to another country necessarily since the background and characteristics of the rail transport market such 
as traffic densities of the network vary. However, experiences in other countries must be studied as they have rich 
lessons for successful railway reforms.
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